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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OoOoo 
Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr., 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
M\l 41990 
The State of Utah, M. Eldon 
Barnes, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, 
Respondent and Appellee, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 900188-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Davidson, and Greenwood. (On Law & 
Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. We summarily affirm the 
trial court's dismissal upon our own motion for summary 
disposition pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10(e). 
On September 25, 1985, petitioner, Oliver Benjamin 
Gerrish, pled guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a 
first degree felony and was sentenced to a minimum mandatory 
term of six years to life in the Utah State Prison. On appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court, petitioner challenged the minimum 
mandatory sentencing scheme. The court affirmed the sentence 
as constitutional. Petitioner also filed a motion with the 
supreme court seeking dismissal of his conviction-sentencing. 
The court dismissed the motion without explanation, terming it 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In May 1989, petitioner 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court 
attacking his guilty plea conviction. The court dismissed the 
petition as successive and procedurally barred. Petitioner 
appealed and the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack 
of prosecution. 
In June 1989, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the 
guilty plea. The court denied the motion, stating that the 
record as a whole established that petitioner entered his plea 
knowingly, intelligently and with full understanding of the 
rights that he was waiving and of the potential consequences of 
the entry of his plea. Petitioner appealed and the case was 
trial court's dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus because the appeal presents no substantial question for 
review. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Qjc&L w- SU^f^J 
J u d i Billings, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OLIVER BENJAMIN GERRISH, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, M. ELDON 
BARNES, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 890906266 HC 
For the reasons set forth in respondent's Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion to Dismiss, 
IT IS ORDERED, that this matter be and hereby is dismissed. 
Dated this So^ day of January, 1990. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
GERRISH V. STATE PAGE TWO ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order of Dismissal, to the following, 
this Jo ^ a y of January, 1990: 
Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr. 
Pro se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84 02 0 
Dan R. Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
Case No. CR85-1142 
CR85-1143 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OLIVER BENJAMIN GERRISH, 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 29th day of September, 1989, 
at 9:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
Page 1 
sworn, please, sir. 
HARLAN Y. HAMMOND 
Called as a witness in behalf of the defendant, was 
sworn and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Alba: 
Q. Would you give us your name for the record, 
please? 
A. Harlan Y. Hammond. 
Q. Mr. Hammond, how are you employed, sir? 
A. I'm chief counsel for Financial 
Administrative Services, which is a legal and accounting 
firm. 
Q. And Mr. Hammond, how long — are you an 
attorney, sir? 
A* Yes, I am. 
Q. Admitted to practice in the State of Utah? 
A* Yes. 
Q. And how long have you been admitted to 
practice in this State? 
A. Since 1961. 
Q. And since 1961, Mr. Hammond, have you 
practiced within the State of Utah? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Have you practiced elsewhere other than 
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within the State? 
A, No, I haven't. 
Q. And what has been the nature of your 
practice, sir, if you can characterize it for the court? 
A. Basically it has been some corporate work, 
some domestic law, some estate planning. Last six years 
I've done quite a lot of trusts, and the like. 
Q. During the period of time, sir, since 1961, 
have you been engaged in doing any criminal defense work, 
sir? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Now, were you the attorney, sir, who 
undertook the representation of Mr. Gerrish sometime in 
1985? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you relate to the court the 
circumstances under which you became engaged to represent 
Mr. Gerrish? 
A, Yes. Mr. Gerrish lived in an apartment two 
houses up from where I lived on First South. I lived at 
1245 East First South at the time, and I was well 
acquainted with Mr. Gerrish. I was well acquainted with 
his situation. We were talking out on the parking of my 
home there at the time that I learned that he was 
requesting — going to be picked up for a matter, and I 
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Q. Had you undertaken to represent anyone 
charged with the same type of crimes that were alleged 
against Mr. Gerrish prior to that date in 1985 when you 
appeared in front of Judge Hanson? 
A. I don't believe I did. 
Q. Prior to your appearance, sir, in front of 
Judge Hanson on September 25th of 1985, had you had any 
conversations with representatives from the county 
attorneys office regarding any plea agreement to be 
reached regarding this case? 
k. Yes. 
Q. With whom, sir, did you have these 
conversations ? 
A. It was a lady attorney, and I don't remember 
her name. 
Q. Karen Knight-Eagan? Do you recall that? 
A. Very likely. 
Q. How many conversations did you have with Ms. 
Knight-Eagan? 
A. I believe I talked with her on the telephone 
prior to the plea hearing, and I believe I talked with 
her just before the hearing. 
Q. Right before the hearing itself here in 
court? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, did you ever take an opportunity, sir, 
after your conversations with Ms. Knight-Eagan, to relay 
to Mr. Gerrish the substance of that agreement that had 
been reached with the prosecution in this case? 
A. Yes. I conveyed to him what they were 
attempting to do. They asked if he had — if he would — 
if he would plead guilty to one of the cases brought 
before him. 
Q» And he had how many cases? 
A. He had two. That they would drop one case, 
and as nearly as I can recollect, strive for a three year 
sentence. 
Q. Okay. Now, what is your specific 
recollection, Mr. Hammond, about a three year sentence? 
A. Well, what do you mean? 
Q. You mentioned a three year sentence, sir, and 
I don't understand in what context that came up. 
A. Well, the law allows three types of 
sentencing for this kind of matter, and one is three 
years, one is six years, and one is nine years. 
Q. And that was your understanding, sir, of what 
the statute provided for in terms of possible sentences 
in the event of a change of plea by Mr. Gerrish? 
A. Yes. Yes, it was. 
Q. It is your testimony today that you conveyed 
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that to Mr, Gerrish prior to his appearance in front of 
the court for the change of plea? 
A. I don't know how much I conveyed to Mr. 
Gerrish. I conveyed to him what the prosecuting attorney 
had told me. 
Q. And I'm not sure I understand exactly what 
that was, sir. 
A. Well, that was that one case would be 
dismissed, and that the prosecuting attorney thought that 
she could get him off on a three year sentence. 
Q. And what did you understand that three year 
sentence to be? That Mr. Gerrish would serve three years 
only? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you convey that to Mr. Gerrish? 
A. I believe I did. I'm sure I did. 
Q. And you were present at the time that Judge 
Hanson advised Mr. Gerrish of possible sentences that 
could be imposed on September 25th, 1985, were you not, 
sir? 
A. Yes, I was here. 
Q. And do you recall the Judge telling Mr. 
Gerrish that he could receive five years under one set of 
circumstances, ten years under another set of 
circumstances, or fifteen years under a third set of 
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Q. (By Mr. Alba) Mr. Hammond, at any time on 
September 25th, 1985, when Mr. Gerrish entered his plea 
of guilty, sir, do you recall ever advising the court of 
the conversation that you had had with the probation — 
excuse me, with the prosecutor's office regarding the 
possible three year sentence that could be imposed on Mr. 
Gerrish? 
A. I don't recall. I don't think I did. 
Q. Do you recall, sir, having raised that 
particular issue again, the three year possible sentence, 
on October 21st, 1985, at the time of Mr. Gerrish's 
sentencing? 
A. NO. 
Q. Were you aquainted, Mr. Hammond, with any of 
the alleged victims who were named in the three separate 
criminal charges that were brought against Mr. Gerrish? 
A. I was somewhat. I lived in their ward. I 
didn't know them — well, I knew the parents, but I don't 
recall the children, and I didn't recall the children at 
that time. 
Q. Did you ever have any conversations with the 
parents during the course of your representations with 
Mr. Gerrish? 
A. It was just one time. 
Q. And when did that occur in relation to the 
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of the possible penalties that you could receive under 
the statute? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You heard his testimony, sir, regarding some 
discussion about three years. What is your recollection, 
sir, about the three years? 
A. It came when we were in the jury room, Mr. 
Hammond told me, "Oliver, if you plead guilty to one 
count, the prosecutor has agreed to drop the other two. 
The prosecute has promised me that you will receive only 
a three year sentence. You will be out in three years. 
The Judge knows about this, so there is no need for you 
to bring it up in court. It is all set up." That's a 
quote. 
Q. You appeared — well, let me just put it in 
perspective. Did you meet with Mr. Hammond on the 23rd, 
and is that why you were filling out the affidavit in the 
jury room? 
A. I don't recall the date, but — 
Q. Eventually you appeared in court on the 25th 
in front of Judge Hanson, and entered a plea of guilty to 
one count; is that correct, sir? 
A* Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you ever bring up with the court, sir, 
what Mr. Hammond had told you about in the jury room? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was Mr. Hammond present in court, sir, when 
you appeared after sentencing for the reduction of 
sentence that occurred in I believe it was February of 
1986? 
A* It was February 16th, 1986. 
Q. Who represented you in those proceedings? 
A. Counsel Joe Carol Nesset-Sale. 
Q. Was she counsel who had undertaken to 
represent your case, sir, on appeal during that period of 
time? 
A. I was made to understand on the 16th that she 
had been appointed to represent me, but that was the only 
time I saw her. 
Q. You are presently in custody, sir, at the 
Utah State Prison? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And have been in continuous custody since 
when, sir? 
A. Since I was arrested. I believe I was 
arrested August 29th, 1985. 
Q. And on any other charges other than the ones 
presently before the court? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. There is no other holds, no other charges 
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Number two, counsel must if an agreement is reached, 
advise the defendant of what that agreement consists of, 
and advise the court of what that agreement consists of. 
It is uncontroverted that the three year discussion took 
place. In fact, Mr. Hammond's recollection was that he 
had told that to Mr. Gerrish, that the prosecution had 
made those representations regarding the three years. 
And I think it's evident, and clear from the record that 
when those items are presented to the defendant, and the 
defendant relies on those representations, then anything 
that occurs in court is not voluntary because of that. 
And for that proposition, Your Honor, I have a case — 
the only case that I was able to find regarding that 
particular area, if I may submit a copy to the court at 
this point, and I have a copy for counsel as well. This 
is a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case in United States 
versus Marsgliano. And in essence, the issue that was 
presented in that case concerns the voluntariness of a 
plea of guilty that was entered into by a defendant who 
had been told, and made certain representations by his 
counsel — given advice not to follow, or not to bring 
that up at the time of the plea or in front of the court, 
and then a different sentence was imposed. In that 
particular case, the Third Circuit reversed the matter, 
sent it back down. This came up on a writ of habeas 
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corpus, where the court below the District Court had 
denied a hearing. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
felt that there was sufficient evidence presented 
concerning the voluntariness of the plea when that set of 
circumstances occurs, where an individual defendant is 
given certain information, he relies on that information, 
and then to his detriment,the court does not follow that 
particular recommendation because it never becomes part 
of the record. 
That is another instance, Your Honor, of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel that was presented, and 
demonstrated by Mr. Hammond in this particular case. A 
third instance, Your Honor, deals with the waiver that 
occurs. And I asked Mr. Hammond his recollection. He 
was negligent, and I think that's being kind concerning 
any discussion at all about a preliminary hearing. And 
there are myriad cases in this particular jurisdiction, 
Your Honor, that deal with the importance of a 
preliminary hearing. It is not a perfunctory matter, it 
is in fact a hearing that entitles a defendant to a 
determination of probable cause. In this particular 
case, Mr. Hammond's recollection regarding that was 
simply that he had none. Mr. Gerrish's recollection 
regarding that was that Mr. Hammond advised him it would 
be of no import, and to waive the preliminary hearing. 
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Utah§tateBar 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • (WATS) 1-800-662-9054 
A8A/Net: ABA 1152 
October 7, 1988 
Mr. Oliver B. Gerrish 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
RE: Complaint against Harlan Y. Hammond 
Dear Mr. Gerrish: 
... Per the request of your letter of September 20, 
1988, and our recent telephone conversation, I am 
providing to you the two ethical rules which the 
Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee 
of the Utah State Bar found that Mr. Hammond had 
violated. The Panel found that Mr. Hammond violated 
Canon 6, DR6-10KA)(1) which prohibits a lawyer from 
handling a legal matter which he knows or should know 
that he is not competent to handle. In your case the 
Panel felt that Mr. Hammond was not sufficiently 
familiar with the criminal law relating to your sexual 
abuse charge and the sentencing ohase. 
The Panel also found that Mr. Hammond violated 
Canon 5. DR5-105(A) which requires that a lawyer 
decline employment if the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or 
is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of 
the proffered employment. The Panel believed that Mr. 
Hammond displayed some bias about the ultimate 
sentencing outcome of the criminal charge against vou 
and that he improperly confused his professional role 
and his ecclesiastical role and failed to act properly 
in his role as an attorney. 
I hope that the above information is helpful to 
you. Again, I would remind you that this discipline is 
private and would ask that you use discretion in 
disclosing this information. 
CAB/dlb 
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
Salvatore MARZGLIANO, Joseph Mogav-
era, Paul R. Labriola, Thomas Graham, 
Bernard Carroll, William Sevransky, An-
thony Noto, Peter Scheib, Carlo Joseph 
Scala, Richard Campo, Ciro J. Graziano, 
Timothy Mitteager, Marilyn Wallace, Je-
rome Otieri, Richard Gunn, Theodore 
Mendel. 
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Cite as 588 F.2d 395 (1978) 
federal facility back to state prison after 
acceptance of his guilty plea but before 
sentencing, when the transfer from state to 
federal custody had been achieved pursuant 
to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequen-
dum, did not violate Agreement Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act, § 2, art. 
IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. App. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Appeal of Joseph MOGAVERA. 
No. 78-1169. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Third Circuit. 
Argued Sept. 8, 1978. 
Decided Nov. 27, 1978. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, Vincent P. Biunno, J., deny-
ing defendant's motion for dismissal of in-
dictment or, alternatively, for withdrawal 
of guilty plea and subsequent sentence. 
The Court of Appeals, James Hunter, III, 
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) defendant who 
produced his testimony, testimony of code-
fendant and testimony of an attorney show-
ing misrepresentations by defense counsel 
regarding sentencing was entitled to a 
hearing to prove that guilty plea was not 
voluntary because of such misrepresenta-
tions and (2) transfer of defendant from 
federal facility back to state prison after 
acceptance of defendant's guilty plea but 
before sentencing did not violate Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers where transfer 
from state to federal custody was achieved 
pursuant to writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quendum. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. 
1. Courts <s=>495 
Writ of habeas corpus ad prosequen-
dum is not a "detainer" within contem-
plation of Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers Act so that transfer of defendant from 
2. Criminal Law <8=»273.1(2) 
Fact that no sentencing agreement ac-
tually existed between trial judge and de-
fense counsel was not relevant to issue 
whether defendant's guilty plea was in-
duced by false promise from defense coun-
sel regarding sentencing. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>273.1(2) 
Defendant's statements at voluntari-
ness hearing to the effect that neither his 
attorney nor Government had made any 
promises to him inducing him to plead 
guilty did not bar defendant from subse-
quently asserting that guilty plea was not 
voluntary because of misrepresentations by 
his counsel as to sentencing which would be 
imposed, particularly since trial judge al-
legedly involved in impropriety was judge 
before whom voluntariness hearing took 
place. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 11, 18 
U.S.C.A. 
4. Criminal Law s=>997.16(5) 
Defendant who asserted that his guilty 
plea was not voluntary because of out-of-
court representations by his counsel as to 
sentence that would be imposed and whose 
assertions were supported by his codefend-
ant and another attorney who were present 
when defense counsel made representations 
made sufficient showing to entitle him to 
hearing to prove that guilty plea was not 
voluntary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. 
Ralph A. Jacobs, Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert 
J. Del Tufo, U. S. Atty., Frank C. Razzano, 
Newark, N. J., for appellee. 
Ronald A. Cohen, Larry Bronson, Orange, 
N. J., for appellant. 
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Before GIBBONS, HUNTER and 
GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge: 
Joseph Mogavera appeals from the denial 
of a motion for dismissal of his indictment 
or, in the alternative, for withdrawal of his 
guilty plea and subsequent sentence. With-
out a hearing, the district court denied re-
lief determining first, that the dismissal of 
the indictment was not mandated by the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18 
U.S.C. app. § 2 (1976), and second, that 
Mogavera had not demonstrated that his 
guilty plea was involuntary under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 (1976). We agree that the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers was not violated, 
though on different grounds from those 
advanced by the district court. However, 
we hold that Mogavera is entitled to a 
hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty 
plea. 
I. 
On August 5, 1974 Mogavera and fifteen 
others were indicted for conspiracy to forge 
and utter United States Savings Bonds and 
for the substantive offense of forging Unit-
ed States Savings Bonds in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 371 and 495 (1976). Mogavera 
was also charged with failure to file an 
income tax return. He was arraigned in 
United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey on September 20, 1974; he 
pleaded not guilty and was released on bail. 
While awaiting trial on the federal charges, 
he pleaded guilty to a New York state 
charge in February, 1975, and was sen-
tenced to a three year term. He began 
serving his sentence in a New York state 
prison on March 10,1975. On June 13, 1975 
the federal government procured his trans-
1. The Supreme Court has recently held that the 
United States is a party to the Agreement both 
as a sending and a receiving "State." United 
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 353, 98 S.Ct. 
1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). 
2. Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1976), provides: 
fer to the federal correctional facility in 
New York City pursuant to a writ of habe-
as corpus ad prosequendum. 
While in federal custody, Mogavera 
pleaded guilty to the forgery and tax 
charges on June 27, 1975. The district 
court judge conducted a hearing to deter-
mine the voluntariness of Mogavera's guilty 
plea as required by Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under oath, 
Mogavera declared that neither his attorney 
nor the government had made any promises 
to him which induced him to plead guilty. 
Mogavera does not challenge the sufficien-
cy of the Rule 11 proceeding. 
After the acceptance of the plea, he was 
returned to the state facility pending the 
preparation of the federal probation report. 
On October 6, 1975 he was again transfer-
red to federal custody pursuant to a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum. He was 
sentenced by the district court judge on 
October 24, 1975 to a five year term—to run 
consecutive to his state sentence—and to 
five years probation to follow his release 
from custody. 
II. 
Mogavera first contends that he is enti-
tled to the dismissal of his indictment on 
the federal charges because his rights under 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
were violated. The Agreement governs the 
transfer of a prisoner from a jurisdiction 
where he is serving a sentence to another 
jurisdiction for proceedings against him.1 
Under article IV(e), if the prisoner is re-
turned to the original place of imprison-
ment before being tried in the second juris-
diction, then his indictment in the second 
jurisdiction must be dismissed with preju-
dice.2 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, 
information, or complaint contemplated here-
by prior to the prisoner's being returned to 
the original place of imprisonment pursuant 
to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, infor-
mation, or complaint shall not be of any 
further force or effect, and the court shall 
enter an order dismissing the same with prej-
udice. 
UNITED STATES v. MARZGLIANO 
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The district court held that the transfer 
of Mogavera from the federal facility back 
to the state prison after the acceptance of 
Mogavera's guilty plea but before sentenc-
ing did not violate the Agreement. The 
court read article IV(e) as requiring dis-
missal only if "trial is not had on any indict-
ment prior to the prisoner's be-
ing returned to the original place of impris-
onment.,, See note 2 supra (emphasis sup-
plied). Thus, it reasoned that the Agree-
ment does not prevent transfers after the 
prisoner is tried in the second jurisdiction. 
Since it determined that the entry of a 
guilty plea is the legal equivalent of a "tri-
al," the district court held that the post-
guilty plea transfers were outside the ambit 
of the Agreement. 
[1] We need not reach the merits of the 
district court's statutory construction. Af-
ter the district court's decision, the Su-
preme Court held in United States v. Mau-
ro, 436 U.S. 340, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 
L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), that a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum is not a "detainer" 
within the meaning of the Agreement.3 In 
each instance, Mogavera's transfer from 
state to federal custody was achieved pur-
suant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quendum. Since the writ does not invoke 
the protections of the Agreement, Mogav-
era is not entitled to the dismissal of his 
indictment.4 
3. This court's holding in United States v. Sor~ 
rell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Or. 1977), that a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum was a "de-
tainer" under the Agreement, was in effect 
overturned by the Supreme Court in Mauro, 
436 U.S. at 349 n.14, 98 S.Ct. at 1841. The dis-
trict court had relied in part on Sorreii 
4. The court also held in United States v. Mauro 
that the protections of the Agreement apply if 
the federal government first lodges a detainer 
against a prisoner and later secures custody of 
the prisoner pursuant to a writ of habeas cor-
pus ad prosequendum. 436 U.S. at 361-365, 98 
S.Ct. 1847-1849. The record does not disclose a 
detainer against Mogavera prior to the issuance 
of the writs so Mogavera does not benefit from 
this holding. 
5. Section 2255 of Title 28 U.S.C. (1976), pro-
vides in part: 
III. 
Mogavera contends alternatively that his 
guilty plea was not voluntary. Under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 he is entitled to a hearing on 
his petition "[u]nless the motion and the 
files and records of the case conclusively 
show that the prisoner is entitled to no 
relief."5 (emphasis supplied) After re-
viewing the appropriate materials, the dis-
trict court, without a hearing, denied relief. 
We address solely the issue of whether Mo-
gavera has demonstrated that he is entitled 
to a hearing and do not decide whether 
habeas corpus relief is warranted. 
As the basis of his section 2255 claim, 
Mogavera alleges that his attorney, Samuel 
R. DeLuca, made false representations to 
him which induced his guilty plea. In his 
affidavit in support of the habeas corpus 
petition, Mogavera claims that, "Mr. DeLu-
ca promised me that if I plead guilty to one 
count of this indictment, and one count of 
the income tax information, that my sen-
tence would not exceed the New York sen-
tence, and would run concurrent with it." 
App. at 24a. Mogavera received a five year 
sentence to run consecutive to the state 
sentence and five years probation on his 
release from custody. Further, Mogavera 
asserts: "Before I took the plea I was ad-
vised by Mr. DeLuca to say yes to all ques-
tions asked by the judge." Id. 
Paul Labriola, Mogavera's co-defendant, 
also submitted an affidavit in support of 
Unless the motion and the files and records 
of the case conclusively show that the prison-
er is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause 
notice thereof to be served upon the United 
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing 
thereon, determine the issues and make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law with re-
spect thereto. If the court finds that the 
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, 
or that the sentence imposed was not autho-
rized by law or otherwise open to collateral 
attack, or that there has been such a denial 
or infringement of the constitutional rights of 
the prisoner as to render the judgment vul-
nerable to collateral attack, the court shall 
vacate and set the judgment aside and shall 
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or 
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as 
may appear appropriate. 
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Mogavera's petition. He claims that he was 
present on an occasion when DeLuca prom-
ised Mogavera that the district court judge 
would give Mogavera a concurrent sentence 
or, at the worst, one or two years to run 
consecutive to the New York sentence. In 
addition, he reports that, "[DeLuca] told 
Mr. Mogavera that it was guaranteed, and 
that if it did not happen as promised, he— 
DeLuca—would take full responsibility, and 
Mr. Mogavera could withdraw his plea." 
App. at 26. 
The crucial affidavit came from Robert 
Weiswasser, a member of the New York 
Bar. He had originally represented both 
Mogavera and Labriola but withdrew from 
representation of Mogavera, apparently be-
cause of a potential conflict of interest. He 
recommended that Mogavera retain DeLu-
ca. Weiswasser states in his affidavit that 
he was present when DeLuca promised Mo-
gavera that if Mogavera pleaded guilty, 
Mogavera would receive a sentence which 
would run concurrent with and not exceed 
the sentence given by the New York state 
court. App. at 27a-28a. 
A careful reading of the affidavits indi-
cates that DeLuca may have led Mogavera 
to believe that he had a special relationship 
with the district court judge and had 
"fixed" the sentence. The Supreme Court 
wrote in Machibroda v. United States, 368_ 
U.S. 487, 493, 82"S.Ct.510.JMJLIbEd.2d. 
473 (1962}, that, "[a] guilty plea, if induced 
by promises . which deprivejtjtf 
tlJeHsiTaracter of a voluntary^act, isrvoid» J^ 
conviction based upon such^a plea is open to 
collateral .attack." This court confronted 
allegations similar to those made by Mogav-
era in Moorhead v. United Stajgs^456 F.2d 
992 (3dJ3ir. 1972)^ Moorhead contended in 
his section 2255 motion that his attorney 
had represented to him that a "proposition" 
had been arranged with the prosecutor: if 
he pleaded guilty, he would get no more 
than a suspended sentence or full probation. 
He also alleged that his attorney directed 
him to respond affirmatively when the 
6. We note that this is not a case where the 
defendant has merely alleged an erroneous pre-
diction of sentence by his counsel, which this 
court has held does not render a guilty plea 
court asked whether his plea was voluntary. 
The lower court denied his motion without 
a hearing. This court held: "A plea in^ 
duced. j?XJ*Sch_ misrepresentations jloes^not 
jneet the federaLstandard_p£ voluntariness. 
. . H^^^^a^%aljmsjepresenta-
tion as to aJpror#3itiouLior>, a_ light _jen-
tence., Tha^2dlegaticji_is_sufficieiit-lQjcec 
quireJ;he holding^of^r^dy^raAry^hearjng/^ 
7 d at995. See Brady v. United States, 397* 
"U.S. 7427755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 
(1970). 
In McAleney v. United ^ States, ^JF2A 
^ 2 J l £ t ^ r ^ l 9 7 6 ^ defense counsel told his 
client that the prosecutor had agreed to 
recommend a light sentence. In fact, the 
prosecutor, when pressed for some predic-
tion, had only given his personal opinion 
that the defendant would receive a light 
sentence; he never promised to give a rec-
ommendation. In granting the motion to 
withdraw the plea, the court held: "[The 
defendant] was entitled to credit his attor-
ney's representation as to the_fa.ctjof_jLUfih 
an agreement, and to rely on it; and if his. 
guilty plea was in fact induced by such a 
representation, we agree with the district 
court that relief is in-order." Id. at 284. 
See generally Blackledge v. Allison, 431 
U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 
(1977); Owens v. United States, 551 F.2d 
1053 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 848, 98 
S.Ct. 155, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977); United 
States v. Pallotta, 433 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 
1970); United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 
591 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Del 
Piano, 386 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1967), cert 
denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2306, 20 
L.Ed.2d 1395 (1968). 
Thus, a claim of attorney misrepresenta-
tion of the type pleaded here may be a basis 
for relief in a habeas corpus action.* We 
must determine, therefore, whether the dis-
trict court erred in denying Mogavera an 
opportunity to prove his allegations. The 
statute requires a hearing "[u]nless the mo-
tion and the files and records of the case 
involuntary. Masciola v. United States, 469 
F2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir 1972). See Weilmtz v. 
Page, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970). 
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conclusively show that the prisoner is enti-
tled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The 
Supreme Court in Machibroda considered 
the circumstances in which a hearing must 
be provided: 
The factual allegations contained in the 
petitioner's motion and affidavit, and put 
in issue by the affidavit filed with the 
Government's response, related primarily 
to purported occurrences outside the 
courtroom and upon which the record 
could, therefore, cast no real light. Nor 
were the circumstances alleged of a kind 
that the District Judge could completely 
resolve by drawing upon his own personal 
knowledge or recollection. 
368 U.S. at 494-95, 82 S.Ct. at 514. 
[2] The alleged misrepresentations 
which form the basis of Mogavera's section 
2255 motion took place at out-of-court 
meetings between Mogavera and his attor-
ney. Also, the fact that no agreement actu-
ally existed between the district court judge 
and Mogavera's attorney, a fact which 
would be within the personal knowledge of 
the district court, is not relevant to the 
issue of whether or not Mogavera's guilty 
plea was induced by a false promise from 
his attorney. McAleney v. United States, 
539 F.2d at 284. Thus, by alleging activi-
ties which took place outside the courtroom 
and beyond the personal knowledge of the 
district court judge, Mogavera brings him-
self squarely within the Machibroda stan-
dards. Accord, Brown v. United States, 565 
F.2d 862, 863 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1977); Moor-
head v. United States, 456 F.2d at 995 (peti-
tioner is entitled to a hearing where the 
motion alleges "matters outside the record 
which, if true, cast serious doubt upon the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea"). 
[3] The government attempts to raise 
the Rule 11 voluntariness colloquy as a bar 
to Mogavera's present action. At the Rule 
11 hearing, the district court judge re-
7. See also United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 
591, 593 (1st Cir. 1970), where the First Circuit 
noted that "the courts have generally conclud-
ed that the Rule 11 record is 'evidential on the 
issue of voluntariness . . not conclu-
peatedly asked the defendant whether any 
undisclosed promises were given to him by 
either the government or his own attorney 
which induced his plea. Mogavera stated 
under oath that there was none. The 
government contends that Mogavera cannot 
now deny his earlier sworn statements. In 
Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 93 
S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973), the Su-
preme Court refused to allow the Rule 11 
proceeding to foreclose later habeas corpus 
attacks. While the Court conceded that a 
defendant "'may not ordinarily' repudiate 
his statements to the sentencing judge," it 
held: "The objective of Fed.Rule Crim. 
Proc. 11, of course, is to flush out and 
resolve all such issues, but like any proce-
dural mechanism, its exercise is neither al-
ways perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to 
subsequent challenge." Id. at 215, 93 S.Ct. 
at 1462. Accord, Blackledge v. Allison, 431 
U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 
(1977) ("the barrier of the plea or sentenc-
ing proceeding record, although imposing, is 
not invariably insurmountable"). 
The McAleney court noted that "most 
defendants could be expected to deny 'any 
impropriety' during the Rule 11 hearing 
and we cannot now say that it 
would be obvious to a poorly counselled 
defendant that he should mention a suppos-
ed 'deal' with the Government, no matter 
how proper." 539 F.2d at 285.7 The ration-
ale of McAleney applies with particular 
force when, as alleged here, the defendant 
may have been led to believe that the judge 
before whom the Rule 11 colloquy took 
place was himself involved in the "impro-
priety." Though we understand the efforts 
of the government to reduce the flood of 
prisoners recanting their Rule 11 state-
ments in subsequent section 2255 motions, 
we must heed the caution of Fontaine and 
Blackledge that the Rule 11 voluntariness 
hearing is an imperfect procedural mecha-
sive," citing United States ex rei McGrath v. 
LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1963). 
Accord, Trotter v. United States, 359 F.2d 419, 
420 (2d Cir. 1966); Scott v. United States, 349 
F.2d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1965). 
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nism which must not be wholly immune 
from collateral attack.8 
IV. 
[4] We hold that Mogavera's rights un-
der the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
were not violated since a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum, the means by 
which he was transferred from state to 
federal custody, is not a "detainer" within 
the contemplation of the Agreement^ 
However, Mogavera has made a sufficient ' 
showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to entitle '• 
him to a hearing to prove that his guilty \ 
plea was not voluntary. The decision of the 
" district court will be affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Ginn BIESENBACH, Joseph Levin, 
Henry Sharman, Lisa B. White, 
Appellants, 
v. 
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Argued Nov. 14, 1978. 
Decided Dec. 4, 1978. 
Minority shareholders brought suit 
both derivatively and on behalf of ail share-
holders against individual members of cor-
porate board of directors, alleging viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. The United States District Court for 
8. We note that this court has recently affirmed 
a conviction for perjury against a prisoner who 
made sworn statements in his affidavit in sup-
port of his section 2255 motion which contra-
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Ray-
mond J. Broderick, J., 446 F.Supp. 98, dis-
missed plaintiffs' federal claims for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted and, as a result, plaintiffs' pendent 
state law claims were also dismissed. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals, Rosenn, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that although plaintiffs 
alleged violations of individual defendants' 
fiduciary duties as directors of the corpora-
tion which could support a cause of action 
under laws of Pennsylvania, such allega-
tions standing alone did not state a cause of 
action under the Securities Exchange Act. 
Affirmed. 
1. Securities Regulation <s=>118 
Although minority shareholders alleged 
violations of individual defendants' fiduci-
ary duties as directors of corporation which 
could support a cause of action under laws 
of Pennsylvania, such allegations standing 
alone did not state a cause of action under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78j(b). 
2. Securities Regulation <3=»118 
The unclean heart of a corporate di-
rector is not actionable under the Securities 
Exchange Act, whether or not it is dis-
closed, unless the impurities are translated 
into actionable deeds or omissions both ob-
jective and external. Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b). 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1832 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, district court must limit its consid-
eration to the facts alleged in the com-
plaint. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 12(b)(6), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Courts e=>624 
Failure to request oral argument on a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted con-
dieted his testimony under oath at the Rule 11 
hearing. United States v. Stassi, 583 F.2d 122 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
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